◎吳耿志, Taipei Times, 09-22-2007

  `That Taiwan is so close to China is a fact that no one can change. However, what can change is the early warning capability.'

US Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Christensen, in a speech before the US-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference on Sept. 11, urged Taiwan to be prepared to defend itself against a Chinese attack at least long enough for US forces to arrive.

This urgent tone should not be taken lightly given the backdrop: China has been reported to have added one missile a week targeting Taiwan for some time. Needless to say, this presents a serious challenge for planners responsible for Taiwan's security.

That Taiwan is so close to China is a fact that no one can change. However, what can change is the early warning capability in detecting Chinese missiles in their low-speed ascending phase.

Several platforms using different technologies and carriers are capable of providing an early warning. The first device is a space-based satellite, either equator-geosynchronous or polar-orbiting.

The second is an airborne platform -- an aircraft or balloon equipped with downward-looking surveillance radar.

The third is a land-based installation of over-the-horizon radar equipment.

The fourth is a sea-based vessel with, for instance, Aegis systems.

For Taiwan, none of the platforms is within production capability. Instead, it depends on foreign sources, in particular the US, for urgently needed detection capabilities.

Meanwhile, other issues such as budget, procurement lead times, crew recruitment and crew training are equally pressing.

What should Taiwan's priority be?

The space-based satellite device is considered the best, but is expensive and most likely not something Taiwan can afford, manage or operate.

The airborne platform offers similar performance to the space-based platform, but it is deficient in terms of endurance and operating crew.

The land-based platform is less favorable because it lacks line-of-sight detection capabilities and, being a stationary target, is vulnerable in an environment of electronic warfare.

The sea-based vessel is the last option. Reported to cost up to US$1 billion and needing more than half a decade to build, Taiwan would need to complete a purchase as soon as possible.

While the budget can be spread over many years, crew recruitment and training, which also takes a few years, must commence immediately so that there is no additional delay.

A second layer of protection also deserves critical evaluation. While the first layer focuses on detection, the second layer aims at effective interception and eventually disabling or destroying incoming projectiles by indirect electronic countermeasures or direct impact.

Taiwan must act, and act soon.

Kengchi Goah is a research fellow at the Taiwan Public Policy Council in the US. .